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Abstract: Two historically diverse research streams 
are now delivering strong industrial performance in 
the engineering of high-integrity, software-intensive 
systems.  The earlier of these is the use of source-
language-based static analysis and formal 
verification.  The more recent is the use of model-
driven design coupled with automatic code 
generation.  Although both have been effective, 
neither is without problems.  Fortunately, these 
approaches are not mutually exclusive and 
combining them offers  a route to ultra-high integrity 
at low cost.  The paper exemplifies the approach by 
describing the combining of SPARK and SCADE and 
illustrating the benefits and opportunities that this 
brings. 
Keywords: Model-driven-design, formal-methods, 
static-analysis, verification, safety-critical 
1. Introduction 
The challenge of producing high-integrity software 
doesn’t get any easier.  Furthermore, the challenge 
exists in a commercial environment which constantly 
demands we meet it faster and more cheaply.  The 
old adage that you can only have any two of faster, 
better, cheaper is constantly under attack with all 
three being demanded simultaneously. 
 
There is clear and compelling evidence that we can 
only hope to meet this challenge by processes that 
favour error prevention over error detection and 
forward prediction of correctness rather than 
retrospective demonstration of correctness.  Such 
approaches come with various labels including 
“correctness by construction” and even “lean 
software engineering”. 
 
A key ingredient of such constructive approaches is 
the use of mathematically-sound, formal methods.  
Only by driving out ambiguity early in the 
development lifecycle can we hope to achieve a fully 
constructive approach.  Formal methods are 
sometimes criticised for their apparent difficulty and 
an encouraging trend is the embedding of formal 
techniques in graphical tools which can combine 
visual attractiveness and ease of use with an 
underlying mathematical rigour. (As an aside, this is 
very similar to tools used in other engineering 
domains such as finite element analysis and 
computational fluid mechanics which also hide 
heavyweight mathematics behind a convenient user 
interface).  These promising approaches to 
introducing precision and rigour to the early lifecycle 
phases must not be allowed to reduce our 
commitment to precision elsewhere, for example in 
code-based static analysis and verification activities.  
The aim is to spread rigour throughout the lifecycle 
not just move it from one place to another. 
 
The combination of mathematically-supported, 
model-based design and  code-based, formal 
verification is therefore a very interesting one.  We 
illustrate the potential benefits from such a 
combination using SCADE as an exemplar of 
rigorous model-based design and the SPARK 
language and tools as an example of rigorous code-
based verification. 
2. The Challenge 
The challenge of producing ultra-high integrity 
software, for use in life-critical or similarly demanding 
domains, is not to be taken lightly.  Firstly the level of 
integrity required can be extraordinarily high.  It is 
not unusual for failure rates as low as 10-9 per hour 
to be demanded.  Given that 109 hours is 114,000 
years, the requirement is that we believe our system 
will only have a 50% chance of suffering a software-
induced failure in 57,000 years of operation.  For 
numerate engineers with a conscience that is 
probably a claim we wouldn’t want to make at all; for 
sure it is not a claim we should make lightly. 
Unfortunately, the challenge is even harder than 
suggested by these rather stark figures.  It is harder 
because we not only have to achieve the required 
integrity but also produce a credible case that we 
have done so before the system enters service.  
Achieving and demonstrating integrity before there is 
any service experience is a unique challenge for the 
producers of safety and security critical software.  
There are many other software systems that have 
become extremely reliable, for example telephone 
exchange switches and even the Linux kernel; 
however, none of these could have been predicted 
to be so reliable before deployment (and most were 
not !). 
The twin challenges of producing high integrity 
software and knowing that you have produced it 
place great strains on the techniques and tools used 
in its construction.  Crucially, it is clear that we 
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cannot rely on dynamic testing alone for the 
construction of such systems.  Dynamic testing has 
both theoretical and practical limitations.   
Theoretically, there is overwhelming mathematical 
proof that claims for software reliability in the ultra-
high integrity domain (<10-6 per hour) cannot be 
sustained by statistical testing alone [1,2,3]. 
Practically, dynamic testing has the drawback of 
pushing verification towards the back end of the 
development lifecycle where the correction of any 
errors uncovered will be at its most expensive and 
pose the greatest risk of schedule delays. 
The challenge of producing high-integrity software 
and an acceptable cost can therefore only be met by 
constructive techniques using unambiguous 
notations which are amenable to logical reasoning. 
The next two sections describe examples of two 
different approaches which exemplify  the application 
of constructive techniques using unambiguous 
notations.  The first, SPARK, is centred on 
programming languages and their verification.  The 
second, SCADE, is concerned with model-based 
designs and their verification. 
The remainder of the paper describes the beneficial 
synergy that arises when these complementary 
approaches are combined.  In principle the approach 
taken is applicable to other model-driven design 
methods and implementation languages; however, 
an essential prerequisite is that both component 
technologies are sufficiently rigorous and formally-
based as to make the links between them exact.  It is 
for this reason that the approach is illustrated with 
SCADE and SPARK which jointly meet this 
requirement. 
3. Overview of SPARK 
SPARK [4] is an annotated subset of Ada with some 
specific properties that are designed to make static 
analysis both deep and fast. The annotations take 
the form of special comments which are ignored by 
an Ada compiler but have semantic meaning for 
SPARK’s support tool, the SPARK Examiner.  
Annotations range in complexity from the description 
of data flows via global variables through to full pre- 
and post-condition predicates suitable for the formal 
verification of operations. 
A key, indeed we believe unique, property of SPARK 
is its complete lack of ambiguity. The language rules 
of SPARK, enhanced by its annotations, ensure that 
a source text can only be interpreted in one way by a 
legal Ada compiler. Compiler implementation 
freedoms such as sub-expression evaluation order, 
cannot affect the way object code generated from a 
SPARK source behaves. For example, a complete 
detection of parameter and global variable aliasing 
ensures that SPARK parameters have pass-by-copy 
semantics even if the compiler actually passes them 
by reference.  The removal of ambiguous language 
constructs allows source-based static analysis of 
great precision and efficiency.  Instead of using static 
analysis techniques to look for errors we can use 
them to prove the absence of certain classes of 
errors.  This rather small linguistic difference masks 
a hugely-significant practical difference: only by 
eliminating ambiguity can we reach the goal of 
constructive, rather than retrospective, software 
verification. 
We can exploit this language property using the 
associated SPARK Examiner tool which divides the 
verification task into two parts:  Firstly we seek to 
show that the program is well-formed. That is, the 
program could be a correct implementation of some 
useful specification because it is free from egregious 
errors such as data flow errors (e.g. use of 
uninitialized variables) and run-time errors (e.g. array 
bounds violations).  Only when this is done do we 
seek to show that the program actually is a correct 
implementation of its specification. This conceptual 
separation is quite deliberate: the first condition 
provides the logically consistent  framework which 
makes the second feasible. The idea that we should 
ensure a program could be correct before trying to 
establish whether it is correct was a major motivator 
for the development of information flow analysis. See 
for example the seminal ACM paper [5] which noted 
that: “most programs presented to verifiers are 
actually wrong; considerable time can be wasted 
looking for proofs of incorrect programs before 
discovering that debugging is still needed”. 
 
The first verification step, showing wellformedness, 
is largely achieved by data and information flow 
analysis.   Flow analysis is important for two 
reasons: 
 
1. Elimination of undefined variable values by data 
flow analysis is an essential step in providing a 
sound environment for program proof. Clearly such 
proofs are complicated if we have to allow for 
unknown and potentially invalid data items. 
 
2. Information flow analysis, which establishes the 
influence of variability of one data item on another, 
provides the main foundation on which we can build 
segregation arguments.  
 
Once we have achieved the goal of having an 
unambiguous source text which is free from gross 
errors such as reading of uninitialized variables we 
have established a baseline that will prove very 
useful when we come to consider how to combine 
SPARK with model-driven design methods. For 
these purposes two key conditions are: 
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1.  The ability to demonstrate properties of the code 
using proof techniques. 
• Strong typing  
• Explicit initialization of data flows 
 • Explicit management of time (delays, clocks, etc) 
2.  The ability to do such analyses with access only 
to the annotated specifications of units on which the 
item being analyzed depends. 
• Simple expression of concurrency (data 
dependencies) 
The associated SCADE Suite toolset is an 
environment for the development of safety-critical 
software. It supports the model-driven driven 
paradigm as illustrated in Figure 2.  The model-
driven approach has the following features: 
 
An illustration of the power of the first of these 
properties is the ability to prove that a SPARK 
program is free from run-time exceptions. The 
Examiner toolset includes provisions for the 
automatic generation of proof obligations that 
correspond to each predefined run-time exception 
check defined by the Ada language. Discharging 
these proof obligations is sufficient to guarantee that 
the associated exception can never be raised. The 
process is described in [6].  Again, usefully for the 
purpose described in this paper, these forms of 
analysis can be taken right to the boundaries of the 
system and down to the bit level.  For example, 
SPARK analysis is fully capable of dealing with 
concept of invalid values such as might be returned 
by a malfunctioning external interface or port. 
 
• The model is the component’s software 
specification. 
• Documentation can be generated from the 
model. 
• The model can be exercised by simulation. 
• Model coverage analysis can be performed to 
assess these test-based verification activities. 
• Formal proof techniques can be applied to prove 
safety properties. 
• Code can automatically be generated from the 
model, using the code generator. 
 
We will see in a later section how the these 
properties are extremely useful in our aim of 
combining source-based static analysis with model-
based design. 
 
4. Overview of SCADE 
In this section we will see how the SCADE 
methodology and toolset allows the description of 
rigorous and complete software specification models 
based on a formal notation [7, 8, 9]. This notation 
includes both block diagrams and safe state 
machines as shown on Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 2: Model-based design and verification with 
SCADE 
 
A user of the above toolset can the apply the 
following three “golden rules”: 
• Share unique and accurate specifications. 
• Do things once (i.e. do not rewrite descriptions 
from one activity of the life cycle in another). 
• Do things right (i.e. prevent errors or at least 
detect them in the earlier stages of a project). 
 
Now, when it comes to the verification activities, 
support is provided by a combination of three 
different tools:  
Figure 1: SCADE Block-diagrams and Safe State 
Machines 
• The SCADE Suite Simulator supports interactive 
or batch simulation of a SCADE model, for both 
data flows and safe state machines.  
The above SCADE notation has been formally 
defined and it has the following characteristics that 
are key in the targeted application domain, i.e. the 
development of safety-critical systems: 
• The SCADE Suite Model Test Coverage (MTC) 
tool is used to measure the coverage of the 
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SCADE model with respect to a given 
requirements-based test suite. 
• The SCADE Suite Design Verifier (DV) supports 
corner bug detection and formal verification of 
safety requirements. 
 
In this paper, we will not further comment on the 
model coverage and the formal verification activities. 
The interested reader may refer to [10, 11]. 
 
Finally, the SCADE KCG Code Generator 
automatically generates the complete source code 
implementing the software specifications for both 
data flows and safe state machines. It does not just 
generate a skeleton; the complete dynamic behavior 
is implemented. 
 
The SCADE Suite KCG 4.2 C code generator has 
been qualified with respect to DO-178B at level A 
[12], to be used for the development of the Airbus 
A380 flight software. This means that the verified 
and functionally validated model of the software is 
safely translated to C code. Thanks to the formal 
input model and the certified code generator, the 
behavior of the generated code is fully safe and 
deterministic.  
5. Remaining  problems 
Thus far we have described two different 
approaches to the development of high-integrity 
software.  Both have strong formal foundations but 
they are otherwise rather different in scope and 
concept.  Since both approaches can point to 
successful industrial use the questions arise: “what 
benefit could we anticipate from attempting to 
combine them?”  Should we, instead, simply regard 
them as alternative approaches rather than seek to 
make them complementary approaches?   
 
The value of combining the two different techniques 
depends on whether each, in isolation, has any 
weaknesses and, if so, whether combining them 
provides a way of addressing those weaknesses.  
Note that “weakness” here doesn’t mean “defect”, it 
simply recognizes that no individual technique can 
be expected to address all aspects of software 
development. 
 
We therefore now examine what parts of the 
software development problem space are not fully 
addressed by each of our two constituent 
technologies. 
 
5.1 SPARK 
 
SPARK is, at its heart, a high level programming 
language.  It contains strong features for the 
effective expression of software designs but does 
not directly address the issue of how those designs, 
especially at the more abstract, architectural level, 
are created.  SPARK users increasingly want to use 
graphical design methods before moving to the lower 
abstraction level of SPARK code.  Clearly graphical 
design methods can be used with SPARK; however, 
unless the graphical method has strong semantics, 
we are forced to defer verification activities until we 
have produced SPARK code that purports to 
implement our model.  SPARK provides very strong 
support for such verification and can produce useful 
results much earlier than can be obtained by 
dynamic testing; however, detection of architectural 
design errors would still be later than might be 
achieved if the verification could be performed 
directly on the graphical design model.   
 
Also arising from its programming language roots is 
the issue of how SPARK code is actually produced.  
Generally it is hand crafted.  While our experience is 
that the coding phase represents a rather small part 
of the overall development lifecycle, and SPARK 
provides very considerable protection against errors 
being introduced during the coding phase, it is 
nevertheless true that developers are increasingly 
seeking to see automatic generation of at least part 
of their source code.  Since SPARK is an 
unambiguous and precise language effective 
automatic code generation requires that the design 
representation from which generation will take place 
is also precise.  Certainly the generation of non-
SPARK source code by some means and its hand 
conversion to SPARK for analysis purposes would 
be a rather pointless exercise giving few of the 
benefits of either code generation or SPARK. 
 
5.2 SCADE 
 
By contrast with SPARK, SCADE is firmly founded in 
the design and modelling phases of the development 
lifecycle.   
 
Model-driven design, coupled with automatic code 
generation, neatly solves the early design phase 
problems but it may introduce a new difficulty: the 
large semantic gap between the model and the 
generated code.  Although the more rigorous 
graphical design tools, exemplified by SCADE, allow 
useful analysis of the integrity of the design models, 
the problem of the trustworthiness of the generated 
code remains.  This has been solved in practice for 
some specific situations like the SCADE C code 
generator that has been qualified for DO-178B and 
certified for IEC 61508.  In some other cases, this 
solution does not exist.  We may also face some 
standards like Def Stan 00-56 where the concept of 
qualification or certification of a development tool 
has not been defined and other means will be 
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required to demonstrate the correctness of the 
automatically-generated code. 
 
Another issue with model driven design is ensuring 
that high-level safety properties of the system are 
adequately captured in the model specifications.  It is 
common in model-driven approaches to regard the 
model as the specification (even, sometimes, the 
requirements) for a component.  The model may 
very accurately capture low level details of each 
modelled component; however, certain system level 
properties may depend on the interaction of several 
individually modelled components.  We can imagine 
a system, for example an aircraft landing gear 
controller, where switch and actuator subsystems 
can be modelled in great detail but where important 
system-level safety properties such as “the 
undercarriage must not be capable of being 
retracted when the aircraft is on the ground” can only 
be established by considering how the individually-
modelled subsystems work together. 
 
Finally, model-based designs rely on a computation 
model that excludes things such as invalid values 
and machine representation of values.  Validation of 
the models, and code generation from them must 
assume that variables are well-formed and correctly 
in their respective types.  The models therefore exist 
inside a boundary of hand written interfaces or 
”device drivers”.  The integrity of these drivers and 
other pieces of “glue” code, as well as their correct 
interaction with automatically-generated code, has to 
be established by some other means. 
 
We can summarise these areas for improvement 
thus (the technology which would benefit from 
solving each problem is shown in parentheses): 
• Rigorous analysis can beneficially start earlier 
than the coding phase (SPARK). 
• Having to hand-craft all code may be less 
efficient than auto-generating some of it 
(SPARK). 
• Trustworthiness of automatically-generated code 
has to be demonstrated to a level dictated by 
various standards in use (SCADE). 
• High-level safety (and other) properties may 
depend on interaction between modelled 
components (SCADE). 
• Auto-generated code must work with device 
drivers and other hand-written, “glue” code 
(SCADE). 
 
6. Why combine? 
As can be seen from the discussion above, we are in 
the happy position of having two technologies, both 
with strong formal foundations, whose strengths and 
weaknesses dovetail almost perfectly. By combining 
them we can retain their individual benefits and 
produce a combined development approach which 
more completely addresses the overall software 
development challenge.  Furthermore, the formal 
foundations of both methods makes it possible to 
combine them in a strong and precise manner. 
 
If we imagine the existence of a formally-based, 
model-driven design tool which can produce models 
from which code in an unambiguous and 
independently verifiable language can be generated, 
we can reap the following benefits. 
 
 The design tool assists with the vital and 
challenging task of getting the architecture and 
conceptual integrity of the system right.  
Furthermore, the rigorous nature of the model allows 
us to carry out various forms of analysis and 
validation; this  provides early error detection which 
is essential for efficient work and allows a forward-
flowing, constructive design technique to be used 
(SPARK gap addressed by SCADE).   
 
Having eliminated as may errors as possible we can 
automatically generate code from the validated 
model (SPARK gap addressed by SCADE).  The 
generation of source code in an unambiguous 
notation reduces the possibility of  the semantics of 
the model and the semantics of the generated code 
differing and therefore increases the value of any 
model-based verification that has been carried out.  
Since code generation is a form of translation, it is 
clearly easier to translate one precise notation into 
another, than it is if one (or both) of the 
representations is potentially ambiguous.   
 
Finally, the generated source code, because it is in a 
precise language designed for analysis, allows a 
completely independent and diverse verification to 
be carried out on both the auto generated code and 
any supporting hand-written components.  
Furthermore, this analysis can reach closer to the 
boundaries of the system because SPARK is able to 
produce useful results from analysing low-level, 
device-driver code (SCADE gap addressed by 
SPARK).   
 
The semantic gap between the verified source code 
and the resulting object code is much smaller than 
that between the original model and the object code.  
(Of course the problem of compiler integrity remains 
but that is a separate problem common to all use of 
high-level languages).   
 
Finally, high-level properties of the entire set of 
assembled sub-system components may be proved 
using SPARK’s proof-based verification techniques 
(SCADE gap addressed by SPARK).  When doing 
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this last form of verification we have another choice.  
Recall that SPARK can be analysed without 
requiring access to the full implementation (bodies) 
of each program unit; only the annotated 
specification is needed.  Provided the SCADE code 
generator translates specification information in the 
model into suitable SPARK annotations, we have the 
option of ensuring that the required properties of the 
entire set of assembled sub-system components are 
met without re-analysing the auto-generated body 
code.  In effect, this gives two levels of verification : 
for the most critical systems and the most 
demanding standards we can do a full, independent 
and diverse verification of all the code, both hand-
written and auto-generated.  For less demanding 
situations, where we are content to take on trust  that 
the auto-generated code will be a faithful 
implementation of its design model, we can show 
that the components fit together properly without 
having to look at the auto-generated bodies at all. 
 
These forms of  diverse verification are a direct 
match to the requirements of standards such as Def 
Stan 00-56 [13]. 
7. Integration in practice 
7.1 Approach  
 
The approach we have taken relies on the existence 
of SCADE Ada Code Generator that generates the 
proper SPARK Ada subset and then on using the 
SPARK tools for performing formal verification 
activities on the generated source code.  
 
Initial experiments of this coupling have been made 
and have been very promising. SPARK offers a level 
of verification that matches or in some case exceeds 
the one of SCADE, thus providing a diverse 
verification path. 
 
Further work will be performed in introducing at the 
SCADE model level more specific annotations that 
will denote safety SPARK properties that could then 
be used as an input by the SPARK verification tools.  
There is also considerable value in enriching the 
type model at the SCADE level to include such 
things as valid numeric ranges of scalar objects.  
SPARK’s ability to reason about freedom from run-
time errors is greatly enhanced if values are 
bounded in this way rather than just being, rather 
lazily, considered to be, say,  “integers”. 
 
7.2 Practical benefits 
 
We foresee benefits in both improved code quality 
and in reduced development time and cost.  
Although it is a frequently stated mantra that you can 
only have two out of these three, it is our 
increasingly frequent experience that the best way of 
reducing cost and time is to improve quality, 
provided that the quality improvement is achieved by 
bug prevention rather than a painful, retrospective 
period of bug detection and removal [14].  The logic 
is inescapable: there is no cheaper bug to remove 
than the one you never introduced! 
 
The use of notations with strong formal foundations 
is a prime way of avoiding the introduction of errors.  
The encapsulation of those notation in a graphical 
design environment makes them much more 
approachable and usable. 
 
We envisage the time benefit being delivered as a 
result of effects that are best shown 
diagrammatically.  In the following diagrams, which 
mimic the familiar “V lifecycle model”, elapsed time 
flows from right to left and increasing level of design 
detail flows from top to bottom.  Descending lines 
are production activities and ascending lines are 
verification and validation activities.  
 
First, we take the V model itself as a starting point. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Traditional V Model 
 
When we add trustworthy code generation to a 
formal system model, we  effectively reduce coding 
time  (in principle, to zero) and remove some low 
level verification activities.  We can conceive this as 
transforming the V model into a Y model, as shown 
in Figure 4 below. 
 
Note that the overall width of the Y is smaller than 
was the V showing a saving in time.  The automation 
of some activities also offers a reduction in cost. 
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Figure 4: “Y” Model Showing Automatic Code 
Generation 
 
In practice, we do not achieve 100% code 
generation because of the need to write low level 
interfaces, device drivers and other glue code.  The 
final diagram shows this in a hybrid V and Y 
lifecycle.  The Y is augmented with a smaller activity 
showing the hand production of interface and other 
glue code. In this case we have achieved complete 
verification of all the code to a very detailed level but 
we have still reduced the elapsed time compared to 
a tradition approach.  Furthermore, we have two 
forms of verification taking place: an early, model-
based analysis; and a later, independent, code-
based analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4: Combined Model Showing Diverse 
Verification Activities 
 
7.3 Possible future work 
 
One tentative but very interesting possibility arises 
from the availability of an independently analyzable 
representation of the  graphical design model.  It 
might be the case that additional model-based 
verification could be achieved by always generating 
SPARK code, as a background activity, regardless of 
the intended end purpose and implementation 
language chosen.  Analysis of properties such as 
freedom from run-time errors could then be fed back 
and displayed at the model level.  Such an approach 
could provide protection from events such as division 
by zero even if the eventual implementation was 
produced using the SCADE qualified C code 
generator.  Note that this possibility can only be 
considered because of the rigorous, formal nature of 
both SCADE and SPARK; clearly the analysis would 
be of little or no value if we can’t be sure that the  
semantics of the model, the automatically-generated, 
background SPARK version of it, and the 
automatically-generated, deliverable C code are 
identical. 
8. Conclusions 
Often we have to make a choice between different 
engineering approaches.  Sometimes having to 
make this choice is rather undesirable because both  
options have advantages that we would like to 
benefit from.  In the case of combining the proven 
benefits of both code-based formal verification and 
rigorous model-driven development, we find 
ourselves in the happy position that we don’t have to 
make  this hard choice; we can have the benefits of 
both approaches.   
 
Our experience with the combining of SCADE and 
SPARK is that we do indeed retain the benefits of 
each.  Crucially, however, it appears that the 
combination only  works because both SCADE and 
SPARK have formal roots.  Clearly combining and 
translating between two exact notations is both 
easier and more effective than if one or other 
component is imprecise in some way. 
 
Finally, we note that the use of  diversity and 
redundancy are key engineering techniques with a 
long industrial pedigree; combining model-driven 
design with formally-verifiable programming 
languages brings them to the information age.    
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